A number of young women did agree to talk to us at Kabul University today. Like our first day at the university, we found a broad range of views among the students – a contrast with yesterday in the market where, with one exception, the men we interviewed are vehemently opposed to the Western occupation.
The small number of people we will be able to interview while we are here for a few weeks is hardly a scientific sampling. The small number of people we will be able to talk to is unlikely to be gender balanced, and particularly not gender balanced across divisions of class and education, but we do hope that we can at least open discussion of some of the issues on the minds of people in Afghanistan when we return to Canada.
We found more support for the Western occupation among students today than on our last visit to the university. Some students expressed unqualified support, regardless of the large numbers of civilian casualties in recent days, which according to local news reports, add to the several hundred civilians already killed this year.
Several women pointed out that while they have personally benefited since the occupation began, they recognise that their privileged position is not typical and most people in Afghanistan are not benefiting from the occupation.
To confirm how privileged these female university students are I checked the latest report from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). The report states:
Girls going back to school have been one of the main images of progress portrayed by the Afghan Government, the international community and the Media. However, today in Afghanistan, 85% of women are illiterate and the total number of schools for girls is half less than the number of schools for boys. Girls represent only 3% of pupils and students, and they are hardly allowed to continue their education beyond the fifth or sixth grade. In addition, the right to education is not granted to children coming from poor families. These children have to work or beg to feed their families, and are at risk as they can be easily be the victims of sexual and other kinds of abuses in their working environment (AIHRC 2006).
Claims that the Western powers have improved opportunities for women, while factual, need to be nuanced by the recognition this is not the case for most Afghani girls and women.
We are also reminded by some students that the Western forces have not only killed hundreds of civilians and injured thousands – people who are often either not accounted for in Western news reports, or are mis-labelled as Taliban – but the Western forces also regularly invade homes, arrest people without reason and generally violate the cultural sensibilities of the people, particularly respect for the privacy of women that is so important to all the ethnic cultures in Afghanistan.
When Angela arrives she will be more closely examining the development issues I have commented on. My intent is to evaluate the Canadian forces counterinsurgency role in this mess by talking to people who have been affected by the Canadian Forces in some way, but it seems few people differentiate between Canadian, American and any other of the occupying forces. We are all Americans in this war.
Kabul, Monday 25 June 2007
Hamayon went to his aunt's house last night to visit and pick up some traditional clothing he had stored there. I also had some traditional clothing made for me so we can move about more easily when we finally travel beyond Kabul. I might have bought something off the rack, but a tailored suit cost less than ten dollars.
Hamayon knew he would not return until later the next day, so he asked our friend Qasim to accompany me for the day. Qasim is a student at the teacher's college, so he suggested we begin our day there interviewing his fellow students. This turned out to be far more difficult than Qasim anticipated.
Arriving at the gate to the college, which is under heavy police guard, I was not allowed into the campus. While Qasim went to the college dean to ask permission for my entry, the police did a thorough search of my bags. The dean agreed to let me enter the campus, but only on condition I would first report to his office for an interview.
The dean was satisfied we posed no threat, but decided to assign one of his colleagues to select students to talk to us. The dean's conditions did not provide me with the random selection of students I had hoped to interview, but considering the circumstances, I agreed to play along with what was turning into somewhat of a farce. I could have just packed up and left at this point – I didn't expect to really get any honest opinions from students when under such tight scrutiny by their instructors – but I was curious to see what might happen.
As it turned out the teacher who selected the students and then stayed to supervise the interviews was dissatisfied with his own selection. He continually advised his students not to talk about politics; nonetheless, the students did. They complained there is no library or internet connection, the buildings are falling apart and furniture and supplies are insufficient. After a few comments like this the teacher considered too political, he summoned the police to escort me off the campus. As it turned out it was worthwhile playing along with the dean's charade of academic freedom.
As Qasim stated, this is typical of Afghani democracy as it has been installed by the Western forces. He and other students who have talked to us believe these academic institutions are intent on training students to be subservient to the regime, not to be able to think independently. In the last few years walls have been built around all the postsecondary schools and large contingents of police are posted at the gates. While these security procedures are supposedly to protect the students, some students believe it is to protect the regime from a potential student revolt.
We decided to film in a poor neighbourhood where Qasim had previously lived with his family for several years. On the way we stopped at his family's current home. Qasim's father is a national police officer; he earns three thousand Afghani per month ($60). The rent on their modest house that does not have indoor plumbing is nine thousand Afghani per month ($180). The family relies on other family members working without documentation in Germany to send money home to Afghanistan.
As Qasim says, at these poverty wages it is no wonder the police force is known for both its corruption and inefficiency. I experienced an extortion scam within minutes of getting off the plane in Kabul. A police officer asked me to step out of line at customs and immigration, give him my passport and follow him past the Afghanis waiting in line. I received my passport a few minutes later stamped for entry and a request from the police officer for twenty dollars. I didn't think it was worth twenty bucks to save a few minutes, but I was hardly in a position to protest. Considering the police officer collected a third of his monthly salary to share with the customs officer, they has a good scam going – an extortion scam that is probably essential to the survival of their families.
At the poor neighbourhood, we met a friend of Qasim's. He led us up a steep and windy road that climbs one of the high hills in downtown Kabul. In Latin America this neighbourhood would be described as a barrio. I don't know if there is an equivalent word in Dari or Pashto, but to call such a place a slum does not do justice to the pride, resourcefulness, and independent spirit of the people who live here.
We wandered through the streets talking with a number of shopkeepers, workers and passers-by. The young men led me to the place where the first victims of the American invasion had lived until 2001 – a pilot attacking the communications and radar systems that sit at the peak of the hill hit this home with a bomb. According to my guides the American pilot was a woman, which was apparently used to spin propaganda by both the Americans and the Taliban.
We talked to the shopkeepers who work on either side of the bombed house; both suffered serious injuries in the blast and one lost his leg.
The intense poverty of this neighbourhood seems impossible to ignore, but it is ignored by the Western occupying forces. As we climbed beyond the densely-packed houses towards the peak of the hill, which is inaccessible because of land mines, an unobstructed view of the city opened up below us. What is most incredible is that anyone looking from a window of the American embassy, which sits at the base of this hill little more than a kilometre away, can clearly see the plight of the poor people living here. The picture here is bleak. Malnourished children wait in line for the water to be turned on at public taps. Raw sewage bubbles up from the dirt road; sewage percolates down through the hill from thousands of outhouses above. This mucky sewage fills the streets then dries to a fine dust that blows about the neighbourhood. The smell of raw human waste and garbage is horribly intense.
The concept of UN peacebuilding developed in the 1990s, which was itself highly problematic, has given way today to a new concept of stabilisation and reconstruction. Canada's START (Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force) and a similar office in the US State Department focus on imposing military order while relying primarily on market mechanisms and non-governmental organisations for reconstruction. It is evident in Kabul, where an initial military stabilisation occurred quite rapidly, that the market mechanisms serve an elite few, but have almost entirely failed to help most of the population.
On a number of occasions people have remarked that at least when the Soviets occupied Kabul they built urban infrastructure, homes, factories, schools and theatres. In Kabul today, the most obvious construction projects are hotels, shopping centres and huge private homes that are displays of ostentatious wealth, but do little to improve the lives of most people. These displays of wealth do, however, seem to stir resentment among the poor majority, judging by the small number of people we have talked to.
I cannot imagine in this state of inequity and poverty that the current political regime can remain stable for long considering the anger and frustration expressed by the poor people we have talked to in recent days. The BBC reported today that Afghanistan will not be stabilised until its opium production is eradicated. I argue that Afghanistan will not be stabilised until people have the basic necessities to lead decent lives. Safe drinking water, sanitary sewers, electricity, paved roads and decent housing are basic essentials that could have been built here in the past five years if there was a political will to do so. A fraction of the billions of dollars spent on military operations could have been used to build basic infrastructure.
Kabul, Tuesday 26 June 2007
Today was not very productive as far as research and filming. We needed to get to a bank and shop for a few basic essentials. The only working bank machine we have found is a long trip from where we are staying. Most of our day was spent travelling across the city, making phone calls, and trying to arrange access to speak to a few key individuals.
As a diversion at dinner time we walked to a shrine to Ali the cousin of Mohammed. This shrine in the middle of a large cemetery is a favourite destination of the faithful and the curious.
I found it odd that food vendors set up their tents in the middle of the cemetery. We sat on top of a grave inside a vendor's tent eating our dinner – a Kabuli street vendor speciality of chickpeas covered in sauerkraut and hot chilli paste called shor nakhud.
I also found it odd that a public water pump is located at the base of the hill directly below the cemetery. I cannot imagine this is a safe source for water. These new public hand pumps, which may be either the product of some development aid program or of the Afghan government, are being installed throughout the city. However, without sewers and adequate garbage collection the level of ground water pollution in the city must be very high. I have often seen these pumps located beside roadside ditches full of sewage that undoubtedly seeps directly into the groundwater.
Kabul, Wednesday 27 June 2007
I was curious about the water situation in Kabul, so I looked up a few statistics from the stacks of reports Hamayon had collected from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). Only 29 percent of Kabulis have access to safe drinking water, according to the AREU. Most people rely on “shallow groundwater sources accessed through wells and hand pumps.” The AREU report continues:
To make matters worse, groundwater levels are steadily regressing due to over-exploitation by a rising population. In addition, improper waste and waste-water disposal result in the tremendous pollution of such water sources, contributing to the high infant mortality rates in the country (AREU 2006).
The AREU study confirms the suspicions I had about groundwater sources. The average life expectancy of 43 years for an Afghani is due in part to the waterborne diseases that are particularly chronic among young children.
Not only is lack of access to clean drinking water itself a problem, but the collection and transportation of water is time consuming and energy intensive work that must be performed by members of a household. As the AREU report points out, this work often falls to children who are responsible for waiting in line to access pumps or taps and hauling water from the source to the home.
Today we were hit by the remnants of the monsoon that caused so much devastation in Pakistan in recent days. Torrential rains flooded the streets of Kabul – water which will soon seep into the ground further compounding the problem of groundwater pollution. The rain is a blessing and a curse – the air is much fresher, but the dusty unpaved roads and sidewalks have turned into mucky quagmires. Hamayon tells me the rain may also be disastrous for the fruit and nut crops.
Since I have this stack of AREU reports sitting in front of me I'll quote another notable statistic. The average per capita income is US$300 per annum, which includes the estimated income from opium production. Considering this is an average and a few people are quite wealthy, this means there are a vast number of people that actually have incomes far less than one dollar per day.
The neoliberal economic ideology that informs the stabilisation and reconstruction project in Afghanistan relies on the Western states to provide military force for stabilisation, but relies primarily on market mechanisms for reconstruction. The problem with this concept of state-building as Sarah Lister and Adam Pain identify in an AREU briefing paper is that “participation in markets is not open to all; benefits are not spread equitably between participants; and the way markets currently operate is having a negative effect on political governance and 'state-building'” (Lister & Pain 2004).
Lister and Pain indicate that a “relatively small group of businessmen dominate major trading activities in Afghanistan.” These are the same businessmen who began developing powerbases in the 1970s and continued to dominate trading throughout the Mujaheddin and Taliban regimes. Their power is based in a hierarchical social system known as wasita, which is a system of patronage or clientalism. This relatively small oligopoly of businessmen is able to maintain dominance, according to Lister and Pain, through price manipulation, possession of capital wealth, political influence, and “high levels of vertical integration at the 'top' of the chain (that is, their companies own other companies or service-providers with which they do business).” In short, a small number of wealthy businessmen compete among themselves for control of the Afghani economy.
Privatisation is an important issue for Afghanis. Like every other Western-controlled state-building project in recent years, the international financial community demands the privatisation of state enterprises in Afghanistan. The Land Titling and Economic Restructuring of Afghanistan (LTERA) estimates at least 14,550 people will be put out of work during the restructuring process. The World Bank and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation have guaranteed a "Social Safety Net" for terminated state employees, but I suspect, based on my research in Guatemala and reams of analysis by researchers elsewhere, these severance payments will not adequately compensate families for their loss of income and few of these terminated workers will be able to find comparable work in the postwar economy.
If the experience in Afghanistan will be like elsewhere, it is highly likely that many of these state jobs will not actually disappear, but will instead be casualised during privatisation – merely transformed from steady, relatively well-paying pensionable work with benefits to become contingent casual work.
I also suspect, as in other cases around the world, the official estimates of the number of workers likely to be terminated is likely unrealistically low. Regardless, at least 14,550 more people, if not more, put out of work in an already devastated economy can only exacerbate existing socioeconomic tensions.
Privatisation of resource extraction industries is high on the hit list in Afghanistan. Extraction of oil, natural gas, coal, rare metals, iron, copper, precious and semi-precious stones, and some of the finest marble in the world are among the Afghani state enterprises that languished under the political regimes of recent decades. While these industries desperately need to be improved, the history of privatisation in other states provides a lesson to Afghanis. The privatisation experience elsewhere has been that state enterprises are sold at low value to offshore buyers and domestic elites with little or no benefit to the vast majority of people who could otherwise potentially benefit from these enterprises.
Extractive industries are also the most environmentally and socially destructive of industries and often return the least benefits to affected communities. The experience with Canadian mining companies, which have 100 percent control of the mining in Central America, should be instructive to Afghanis. While a foreign mining company operating in Canada is expected to follow environmental, labour and social regulations, pay a royalty on extraction usually of 14 percent as well as corporate taxes, Canadian mining companies operating in Central America generally pay a royalty of 1 percent on production, no taxes, and these companies have demonstrated no regard for environmental, labour and social regulations.
The Ghori Cement Enterprise, Northern Fertiliser Plant, Northern Coal, Afghan Gas Enterprise and Rokham Marble Enterprise are the first state enterprises to be tendered for sale according to the AREU. As the AREU was preparing its report in 2006, the Ghori Cement Enterprise was sold in a deal that the AREU charges lacked accountability and transparency.
In the short-term there are no plans to privatise essential infrastructure such as roads, electricity and water, but Brishna, which is responsible for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity is expected to seek private financing in a private-public-partnership in 2009 after a substantial state-managed reconstruction process financed by the World Bank is completed.
In its evaluation of the Government of Afghanistan's privatisation policy, the AREU concludes:
There is no clearly outlined and outward strategy on social impacts in the government's one-page privatisation policy. There is no detailed assessment of social impact in the public domain and no assessment of whether environmental and social protection institutional support is in place. Privatisations in other countries suggest that the majority of employees are unlikely to be kept on after divestment (AREU 2006).
The neoliberal mantra of the so-called international community dictates the privatisation of state enterprises, but privatisation is causing a great deal of controversy among Afghanis, which may well lead to further conflict. •
No comments:
Post a Comment